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Sovereign Debt Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information
Abstract

This paper analyzes equilibrium debt contracts under potential
renegotiation in the presence of sovereign risk.

A simple model of

borrowing from abroad to smooth consumption with stochastic national income
is studied.

Borrowers can choose to repudiate their debt obligations but

face sanctions for doing so.

Under free entry in loan contracts,

equilibrium debt renegotiations take the form of reductions in current
debt-service obligations with a new equilibrium market debt-contract.
Under symmetric information, net inflows of funds are never provided in a
renegotiation to a recalcitrant debtor.

This contradicts part of the

rationale given by several authors for a strategy of "defensive lending" to
problem debtors.

Asymmetric information about some debtor characteristic

is introduced, and renegotiation of existing debt-service obligations is
shown to give rise to separating equilibria.

Because of the presence of

private information, new net inflows may occur along with significant
increases in future debt obligations in the event of renegotiation.

The

implications of these results for the dynamics of debt-service obligations
and several extensions of the simple model are discussed.
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Sovereign Debt Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information
Kenneth M. Kletzer
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the negotiation of the
terms of contracts between private lenders and sovereign debtors.

Credit

market equilibrium when debt contracts are subject to renegotiation is studied
in a framework which emphasizes the ability of a sovereign to repudiate its
debt obligations.

Our objective is to examine the consequences of contract

renegotiation for new capital inflows to a country and the growth of its
external debt burden.

Some of the results suggest that private negotiations

lead to socially inefficient outcomes.
Several authors have discussed the potential of new loans to problem
debtor nations for increasing the present value of existing external debt.
Two issues need to be distinguished.

The first of these, which is addressed

in this paper, is the hypothesis that additional funds provided to a currently
recalcitrant sovereign debtor form part of an optimal strategy for creditors
as a whole.

Cline (1983), Krugman (1985, 1987), Sachs (1984), and others

argue that additional funds reduce the probability of default on outstanding
debt.

Cline, in particular, merely assumes that new loans reduce the

likelihood of default, so that additional loans which taken by themselves
achieve negative expected profits provide the benefit of raising total
expected repayments of outstanding debt.

Therefore, the total return on the

incremental loans to all creditors exceeds their opportunity cost.

The second

issue is that private lenders do not provide additional funds which increase
the expected present value of all existing debt because existing creditors may
be unable to internalize all the benefits due to the public-goods aspect of
the new loans.
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The characteristics of equilibriwn loan contracts subject to subsequent
renegotiation are discussed in a simple model of borrowing from abroad to
smooth conswnption when national income is stochastic, following the approach
of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).

Borrowers have the ability to repudiate their

obligations, but face sanctions for doing so.

Lenders are asswned to be risk

neutral and there is free entry in loan contracts, so that new creditors will
provide any debt contract which assures them non-negative expected profits
given existing debt service obligations.

When a debtor suffers a low income

state, repudiation with consequent penalization can be superior to meeting
debt service obligations as originally contracted and choosing a new debt
contract that provides zero expected profits to lenders.
In this case, existing creditors have an incentive to reduce the
repayment obligations and refrain from declaring a default.

A breach of

contract does not automatically lead to declaration of default, because this
is a subsequent option available to creditors and need not be exercised.
Equilibriwn contract renegotiations are first examined for the case in
which the debtor's current state is common knowledge.

Optimal second-best

renegotiations for the creditor in the presence of free entry in new debt
contracts are shown to result in a reduction in existing debt service with no
concurrent net inflow of funds to debtors.

Furthermore, simple relending of

funds to cover existing debt service payments in order to obtain an option on
even larger future repayments is not, in general, optimal behavior for a
creditor.

The rationality for lenders of such "defensive" lending and debt

reschedulings (suggested, for example, by Cline (1983) and Krugman (1985 and
1987) is put into question by these results.

The first section of this paper

shows that when debtor prefers the penalties that accompany repudiation to
"repaying its current debt and taking a new loan "contract that assures
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non-negative expected profits to a new lender, then the old creditors' best
actions are equivalent to reducing current debt service payments followed by a
new market debt contract.

Lindert (1986) makes a similar argument in a model

without·repaym ent renegotiations, in which the debtor can choose only full
repayment or repudiation.
The section concludes by comparing debt contracts with subsequent
renegotiation to equilibrium complete state-contingen t loan contracts,
constrained by the possibility of repudiation.

Under free entry, ex post

renegotiation of standard debt contracts does not lead to the same outcome as
lending with ex ante specification of state-contingen t repayment schedules.
The next section of the paper introduces asymmetric information about the
debtor's state; this motivates the use of debt contracts in place of state
contingent claims.

Equilibrium renegotiations in this extension of the simple

model of sovereign borrowing may entail debt reschedulings and new capital
inflows in order to satisfy a set of incentive compatibility constraints.
These alternatives to debt write-downs will separate borrowers according to
their current state, which is not observable directly by creditors.

By

inducing self-selection by borrowers, equilibrium debt renegotiation offers
induce revelation of the debtor's private information.

The introduction of

private information qualifies the argument made in the perfect information
model, but for very different reasons than those given by proponents of
defensive lending.

Debt-,:-enegotia tion in this model leads to a dynamic

behavior of net capital flows and debt-service obligations that may be of some
interest.

Poor states of the world for debtors lead to large increases in

debt burdens although the net inflow of capital is negative or small.

The

marginal rate of interest for rescheduled debt can become very large as a
consequence of the asymmetry in information.
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A natural extension of the analysis of these two sections is the
introduction of bilateral bargaining ex post, to give debtors more market
power than simply access to new lenders.

The adoption of the noncooperative

strategic approach to the Nash bargaining problem in the complete and perfect
information model will not affect qualitatively the outcomes of debt
renegotiation.

Under incomplete information about debtor characteristics,

separation of different types of borrowers occurs through strategic delay
rather than choice over a number of simultaneous offers made by creditors.
The third section presents an approach to extending the analysis under
asymmetric information to, a strategic Nash bargaining framework.
separating and pooling equilibria are possible outcomes.

Both

The model outlined

includes capital accumulation, so that depreciation of the per capita physical
capital stock is part of the social cost of delaying agreement in debt
renegotiations.
The fourth section briefly summarizes a multi-period contracting approach
when the debtor has sovereign immunity and lenders can credibly enter into
contractual obligations binding on them which are enforceable in creditor
nation courts.

An application of such contracts, which incorporate,

explicitly or implicitly, the possibility of revision, is the self-enforcement
of restrictions on debt-dilution and provisions for debt-seniority.

Contracts

providing access to future loans on favorable terms provide an incentive for
performance contingent on future events; repayment terms for early periods
compensate lenders for the expected loss on these future contract options.
An alternative to the two extreme information assumptions is also
discussed.

A more realistic assumption may be that the debtor's current state

is observable by creditors, but that policies (for example, those affecting
investment levels) chosen by debtors are unobserved by lenders.

In this case,
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the pattern of capital flows over time induces debtors to choose certain
policies, but contracts cannot be written or renegotiated contingent upon the
choice of policy.

Capital flows can, at best, depend only on the history of

borrower income in a stochastic model.

The principal-agent approach to the

repeated moral hazard problem can be extended to the sovereign borrowing case
under a number of restrictive assumptions to yield a characterization of
constrained optimal capital flows contingent on income.

With the violation of

the validity of a major assumption a distinct possibility arises that a
complementarity between the collective actions of lenders and borrower policy
choices can lead to inferior outcomes.

This is especially likely when the

policy instruments available for transfering resources from the private sector
to the government for debt service are distortionary.

Equilibria can exist

that involve periods of large capital outflows requiring policies creating
significant deadweight losses.
non-negative profits.

At the margin, no additional loan will achieve

However the burden of distortionary policy can lead to

a fundamental non-convexity.

A large reduction in the current trade surplus

may lead to an adequate shift in the marginal productivity of new loans to
support the lower current debt service requirement.

Since this requires

lending by creditors with concurrent domestic policy revision by debtors,
coordination can be a significant problem.
The last section offers concluding remarks and discusses implications of
the asymmetric information case for the dynamics of debt service obligations.
These suggest a significant social inefficiency reflected in the onset of
repayment difficulties.
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I.

Debt Renegotiation in a Principal-Agent Model

This section discusses the renegotiation of debt service obligations in a
version of the familiar Eaton-Gersovitz (1981) model.

The sovereign debtor

always has the option to repudiate its obligations outright and suffer
consequent sanctions.

The reduction in social welfare for the debtor country

that sanctions can cause is limited, so that the borrower has limited
liability for debt obligations.

We assume that the threat of penalization for

repudiation is credible and that creditors receive nothing by imposing
sanctions.

The behavior of the borrower is derived by maximizing a discounted

stream of felicity of current consumption subject to a set of constraints.
This represents a decision maker's social welfare function.
produced and consumed.

A single good is

For simplicity, we ignore investment, so that output

is an exogenous random variable.

Under the informational assumptions of this

section and the next, investment plays no essential qualitative role.
If the debtor chooses to repudiate, it receives a level of utility,

V,

which depends on the current realization of output, y, and possibly on the
value of the outstanding debt service obligations, R.

That is, the

repudiation level of utility depends on the debtor's current state, (y,R).
The borrower's felicity function, U(c), is concave, displays positive marginal
felicity of current consumption, c, and is continuous.

In equilibrium, the

borrower will face a set of debt-contract offers in the event it chooses to
pay current debt service and another set of offers if it seeks to renegotiate
current contractual obligations.

Because we assume a stationary environment

(output is identically and independently distributed each period), the
borrower can always select the same debt contract each period by paying the
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interest obligation on the constant principal every period.

Since the

realized level of output is observed before current consumption and the new
loan is chosen, the borrower will select different contracts (or repudiation),
including a possible request to renegotiate, depending upon the current state,

(y,R).
An important assumption is that there is free entry in debt contracts
any expected profitable contract will be offered by a pool of potential
lenders.

If a loan providing non-negative expected profits will be accepted

by a borrower, then it will be offered by some creditor.

When a debtor

prefers repudiation to repayment and selection of a new debt contract from
this pool of potential lenders, existing creditors have an incentive to offer
combinations of net current payments and new debt service obligations that
cannot be obtained from the market.

We model such renegotiations in a setting

in which current creditors make offers to their debtors who choose to accept
or reject these offers, but do not make counteroffers.

This corresponds to a

principal-agent setting in which the market power of existing creditors is
limited by the potential entry of new creditors.
The utility maximization problem for debtors is first described.
provides constraints for the creditor's maximization problem.
is a pair (it' R

t+1

), where i

t

This

A debt contract

is the principal provided at time t and R

t+ 1

is

the total debt service obligation due at time t+l, or, equivalently, the time
t+l present value of the contracted repayment obligations.
In the event of full repayment, the borrower's value is given by:

(1)
with respect to i

t

and R

t+ 1

subject to (it, Rt+l) ES,
where the set Sis independent of (yt' Rt).

The expectation is taken with

8

respect to Yt+l; V(·, ·) will be defined below.

The set Sis the·equilibrium
The

set of debt contracts providing non-negative expected profits.
difference, (it - Rt), is the net inflow of funds at time t.

The discount

factor,~, is between O and 1.
Let the debtor's repudiation value under limited liability be given by

V(yt,Rt) which is increasing in yt and non-increasing in Rt.

In the event of

renegotiation, the debtor will choose a contract from a set of debt contracts
that depend on the information available to creditors.
always includes R
this section.

t

We assume that this

and discuss the case in which y t is common knowledge in

In the next section, it is debtor private information.

Define:

re

(2)

(yt,Rt) = max [U(yt +it-Rt)+ ~EV(yt+l' Rt+l)],

subject to (it,Rt+l)

E

S(yt' Rt).

This latter set contains Sand will include additional contracts if Vr(y t ,R)
t
is less than V(yt,Rt).

The value of the debtor's optimal program is just

V(yt' Rt)= max (il°e(yt' Rt)' V(yt,Rt)),

(3)

since il°e(yt,Rt) is at least as great as il°(yt,Rt).
The distribution for output is assumed to have compact support.
expectation of Vis taken with respect toy t.

The

We use the shorter notation

EV(R) for the remainder.

Creditors are assumed to be risk neutral (therefore, expected profit
maximizers) and face an opportunity cost of loans given by a discount factor,
p.

A one-period debt contract provides expected profits given by
(4)

where the expectation, taken with respect to the distribution of output, is of
the actual period t+l present value of debt service payments conditional on
the contractual obligation, R

t+ 1

.
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The legal status of existing debt service obligations within or between
creditor nations will be crucial for determining the set of offered contracts.
For example, while loan covenants binding on debtor behavior may not be
credibly enforceable, seniority provisions binding on subsequent lenders may
be enforceable in creditor nation courts.

A senior creditor may be able to

recover fully any payments made to successor lenders in its home country up to
On the other hand, if all claims have equal priority,

its contractual claim.

creditors will share according to some proportions in actual settlements.
Suppose that the variable x denotes the surplus available for meeting
debt service in an equilibrium settlement of obligations and that xis
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(x).

This

distribution depends upon the distribution of y and is conditional on R, in
With strict seniority, the senior creditor obtains expected

the general case.
profits

Err(i,R) = -i +

p

[

(5)

Ii xdF(x) +RI~ dF(x) ],

where His the maximum total settlement possible.
A second creditor will obtain

- R; R) = -i- +
Err(i,
with contract (I,

R)

p

[

IR
R dF]
R (x-R)dF(x) + R-IH

given prior commitments R.

In such an instance, the set

of new debt contracts available to a borrower will be identical for any number
of concurrent loans taken.

The debtor can do no better than to accept a zero

expected profit contract from a single source.
If lenders share in payments according to the portion of their claims in
total claims, then each lender attains expected profits

Err(i. ,R..L ;R)

-i +

.L

where R =

~

i

R ..
.L

p

R dF(x) ],
[(Ri/R) I ROx dF(x) + Ri IH
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In this case, in an equilibrium debt contract, each lender correctly
anticipates subsequent contract offers so that expected profits for every
creditor are non-negative.

The set of total' debt contracts that attain

non-negative expected profits is the same whenever obligations to new lenders
do not take precedence over existing debt, since the conditional distribution.
of xis unaffected.
same.

However, the equilibrium ·debt contract will not be the

Under strict seniority, the choice of contract made in equation (1)

will be the best zero-expected profit contract for the debtor (equivalent to
the Nash equilibrium contract under observability defined in Kletzer (1984)).
In the absence of seniority provisions (for example, the neutral case above),
the equilibrium contract will be an interest-rate taking zero-profit contract,
as defined in Kletzer (1984) (equivalently, in Gale and Hellwig (1985)).

This

type of contract is socially inefficient, in that it is dominated for the
debtor by the strict seniority outcome.

For now, we assume that seniority

provisions enforceable between creditors in their home courts are credible.
The initial description of equilibrium debt renegotiations in this
standard approach will be made assuming that the debtor always has the option
to pay contractual debt service and select a new debt contract that will
realize a non-negative expected profit.

However, a new debt contract may not

be offered if existing obligations are not met, because new creditors' claims
are junior to existing claims.

If new funds are offered when old debts are

not being serviced, in the absence of a negotiated settlement, the debt
service obligations on these new funds are at least as great as they would be
for incremental funds taken in addition to the original contract (that is, the
additional debt service that would be incurred.to obtain a larger original
contract).

The additional debt service obligations will be even greater if
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the old creditors can claim additional interest from payments made to the new
suppliers.
Free entry in debt contracts and the limited liability of debtors impose
limitations on the outcomes attainable by creditors in debt service
renegotiations.

Constrained contract renegotiations for the lender can be

described using a principal-agent framework in which the creditor offers
contract revisions to the debtor.

We first assume that the borrowers' current

output, y, is common knowledge (throughout, we assume that the debtor's
utility function is common knowledge).

In this setting, a first-best contract

may not be a standard debt contract with ex post renegotiation of debt service
because additional risk sharing may be provided by state-contingent contracts.
We first discuss renegotiation of debt contracts because this corresponds more
closely to the framework in which the case for defensive lending has been
argued.

The structure of equilibrium state-contingent contracts in this

approach is discussed at the end of this section.
Because the equilibrium set of debt contracts offered will be bounded
from above in 1, there exist states such that the borrower prefers repudiation
to full repayment.
probability.

These states can be shown to occur with positive

Because creditors lose the entire opportunity cost of their

loans in a repudiation, any settlement that provides some current repayment or
net expected future payment will be preferred by the creditor.

The borrower's

alternative of choosing a zero-expected profit contract (but junior claim)
from another lender without repaying will, at the worst, result in a loss to
the current creditors of the opportunity interest on the maximum settlement
they would obtain in the current state.

If we assume, for simplicity, that no

additional interest is attainable, then the debtor prefers to repudiate if
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V(y,R) > max(max (U(y + I) + f3EV (R + R)), Vr (y,R)},

(6)

(I,R+R)ES
Modification for imperfectly enforceable seniority clauses or enforceable
contracts specifying overdue interest charges is straightforward.
Whenever (6) obtains, creditors will select contracts that provide the
debtor with utility at least equal to the repudiation level.

These offers

If we make the simplification

will depend only on the debtor's current state.

that V(y,R) = V(y), then the equilibrium expected profits for debt contracts
is given by (5), where F(x) depends on the level of debt service obligations
and the distribution of y.

S = { (i,R)

I

Err

The set Sis given by

(i,R) > 0}

When only the lender makes offers that the debtor accepts or rejects (in the
presense of free entry of new creditors under our seniority assumption), the
equilibrium renegotiated offers satisfy
(7)

with respect to i(yt), R(yt)
s.t. V (yt) ~ U( yt + i(yt) - R) + /3EV(R(yt)).
Note that any solution cannot be contained in

S

since (6) holds.

The solution

to this problem is identical to the solution to the problem:
max R

s.t. V(yt) ~ max [ U(yt + i' - R) + /3EV(R') ],
with respect to (i', R') ES
The profit-maximizing lender will never choose to make an offer of a net flow
of funds to or from a debtor that involves an incremental loan providing
negative expected profits.

Any creditor-optimal renegotiation is equivalent

to a simple reduction in current debt service (in expected present value
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terms) plus a new loan attainable from any potential entrant.

The creditor

should be indifferent between offering a current net payment with a new debt
service obligation and offering a reduction in the current debt service just
enough that a new creditor will take over the debt and the borrower will not
choose to repudiate.

Because the debtor always has the option to repudiate,

the expected value of continuation in (1)-(3) must be at least as great as the
expected value under repudiation.

Therefore, whenever (6) obtains,

contractual performance must require a net outflow of output from the debtor.
A solution to problem (7) never entails a new inflow of funds to the borrower.
A common .argument (for example, Krugman (1985)) is that the relending of
contractual debt service obligations when a debtor is unwilling to meet them
currently is a preferred action for lenders because the option on higher
future payments is obtained at no cost in new capital.

The above discussion

lends considerable doubt to this common sense proposition.

Relending old debt

service with interest and a zero current net flow of funds is not generally
the optimal ex post contract for the creditor.

The maximum expected present

value of a renegotiated contract is attained by reducing debt obligations by
just enough so that the debtor can achieve its repudiation level of utility by
selecting its optimal new zero-expected profit debt contract.

This debtor

action (or its equivalent, in which current creditors are also the new
providers of the zero-expected profit loan) extracts all the debtor's surplus;
therefore, no other contract renegotiation is superior for the current
creditors.

The option on new debt repayments under the rollover scheme has a

positive opportunity cost; starting at the creditor-optimal revised contract
devised above, a negative expected profit loan must be made implicitly to
provide the rescheduled loan that gives the debtor utility equal to its
repudiation utility.
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Figure 1 depicts the set of new debt contracts, S, and indifference
curves for the debtor for the more general case of the repudiation utility
depending on bothy and R.
resources to the debtor.

The horizontal axis measures the net inflow of
The set Sis not bounded from above in contractual

obligations in the presence of equilibrium renegotiations.

The maximum

expected present value of a renegotiation attainable by creditors can be seen
to be the greatest value of -R such that the set S intersects the repudiation
indifference curve.
Because the debtor has limited liability for debt obligations in this
framework, the utility attained with a current zero net flow of resources is
always at least as great as the level of utility received by repudiating.
Therefore, no new flows from lenders are required to avoid repudiation.
The presence of debt service obligations as a state variable introduces a
simple history dependence in the expected utility of debtors and the
renegotiation offers made available.

Past realizations of income affect

current choices of debtors and, in the event of renegotiation, existing
creditors.

In this simple Markov model, however, the set of new debt

contracts, S, is unaffected.

In equilibrium, only partial risk sharing

between risk-neutral lenders and risk-averse borrowers is achieved through
debt contracts with renegotiation.

This occurs because creditors are limited

in their abilities to obtain large payments in the best income states of
nature.
An alternative approach to the problem of lending with potential
repudiation under complete and perfect information is to derive the first-best
type of contract (constrained by the threat of repudiation) that will be state
contingent.

The problem of characterizing such contracts in our setting can

.be posed as a simple static constrained maximization problem by recognizing

slope= 1/p

'·

s
·.,
~-,.\,

·~,.

-R

·,.

'.,"

-R'

0

Figure 1

Q, -R

0
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that the future utility of the debtor will be determined completely by the
difference between income and debt service obligations, (y

t+1

-R(y

t+1

)),

since repudiation will never occur (if creditors receive nothing in that
event).
The first-best problem with free entry in loan contracts is given by
(assuming Vis only a function of y):

with respect to
subject to
and

it and R(yt+l),
V(y t+l - R(yt+l)) ~ V(y t+l), for each y t+l

-it+ pE(R(yt+l)) = 0.

The solution to this problem is straightforward and entails constant
consumption for a subset of the output states, if

p

equals~-

The states for

which utility may be held to the repudiation level will be the high output
states, not the low ones.

Consumption is imperfectly smoothed if repudiation

is superior in some (high output) state to consumption of mean output.
contrasts sharply with the second-best renegotiation case.

This

If p exceeds~

(the borrower is more impatient than the lender), then a sequence of
one-period loan contracts may smooth income for early periods, but after the
repudiation constraint becomes binding in the best output state, consumption
will continue to decline and will not be smoothed thereafter in the framework
used above.

Worrall (1987) adopts a trigger-strategy penalty mechanism for

competitive lenders and shows that long-run consumption smoothing can result.
In the perfect information setting, first-best contracts are fully state
contingent.

Such contracts cannot be replicated by simple debt contracts with

ex post renegotiation in the presence of free entry of new creditors.
latter type of contracts may arise as first-best outcomes when debtors'

The
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current states are observable by creditors only at a cost (for example, see
Gale and Hellwig (1985)).

II.

Private Information and Separating Equilibria

In this section, debtors are assumed to possess private information about
the utility they receive by accepting various debt contracts.

Therefore they.

have an incentive to report incorrectly their willingness to repudiate to
obtain a reduction in debt service payments.

Whenever lenders perceive a

positive probability, given current debt obligations, that a borrower would
prefer repudiation to the selection of a new debt contract with repayment, the
borrower may be able to misrepresent its private information.

If creditors

are unable to observe the realized value of output, under the equilibrium
renegotiation scheme of the previous section in every output state the debtor
will claim willingness to repudiate.

Some contract with debt service

reduction chosen in a low output state will be preferred in a high output
state to repayment.

Creditors will seek to design the offers they make in

debt renegotiations to induce correct revelation of the private information.
Lenders will want to offer debt renegotiation packages which will be chosen
over repudiation in poor events but which are inferior to repayment in
favorable outcomes.
The private information possessed by debtors can be anything that affects
the social welfare attained by choosing different debt contracts.

For

example, national leadership may be better informed about factors determining
the social costs of achieving given levels of trade surplus than are foreign
creditors.

For expositional simplicity, let the realized value of output be

unobservable by creditors, although we intend it to be a proxy for some
measure of debtor country surplus.

The distribution of output is assumed to

17

be common knowledge, as are all other characteristics of the borrower.

Also,

suppose that output, y, can only take a finite number of values with positive
probability.

These are given by y , y , . . . ,y in increasing order.
2
1
n

The

random variable, y, can be thought of as parameterizing a class of utility
functions for the national leadership.

Creditors do not know what type of

decision-maker they face at each date.

Each period a new type is drawn from

the common distribution.

In this interpretation, the period length is the

time a particular type is in power.

Again, the identification of y with

output is not intended to be literal.
The creditors' problem is to choose a set of contracts to offer in the
event of renegotiation requests such that their ex ante expected profit is
maximized, when debtors ex post maximize utility over the set of contracts
(including renegotiation packages) available.

A contract renegotiation will

be chosen only if it is the maximal contract in the realized state over the
set of contracts offered for all states.

The creditor's inability to observe

output implies that debtor self-selection alone must be relied upon to assure
the anticipated behavior in each output state.

The creditor's problem is to

design a contract set that induces truthful revelation.

The equilibrium set

of renegotiations offered will separate different output realizations through
contract choice, so that ex post the private information is revealed.
The set of equilibrium offers under free entry in ex ante contracts,
debtor-creditor relationships) and debtor limited liability is characterized
again using a principal-agent framework.

Because simple reductions in debt

service will be chosen by the borrower in either low or high output states,
offered revisions of debt repayments under asymmetric information about output
realizations must observe a self-selection constraint.

The contracts offered
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to assure non-'repudiation in low output states must be inferior to other
contracts available when the debtor realizes high output value.

The addition

of constraints assuring correct contract selection leads to a separating
equilibrium.

There will be n contracts available, with a different contract

selected in each output realization.

The contract intended to be selected in

a particular state will provide the maximum utility to the debtor in that
state over the set of offers.

Some of these contracts will simply be the best

choices over the set of new debt contracts available from any potential
creditor.

That is, the set of ex ante debt contracts will always be available

with repayment of contractual debt service.
The set of ex ante debt contracts (those available from any new entrant
creditor following repayment) will be found by first characterizing the set of
ex post repayment revisions offered in equilibrium for a given current debt
service obligation, R.

Each member of the set of debt contracts offered by

the current creditor will consist of a current net payment and a debt service
obligation for the next period.

These contracts will not be equivalent to the

debt reductions derived in the previous section.

Imposition of the

self-selection contraints is found to result in lower ex post profit in each
state than could be attained if the value of output were observed directly by
the creditor.

The equilibrium set of contracts involve higher levels of debt

service for the next period for low output realizations than would arise with
symmetric information.
The set of ex ante offers is derived using the solution to the creditor's
ex post problem, as a perfect equilibrium.

The set of initial non-negative

expected profit contracts offered is a subset of what it would be without
private information.

Lenders are assured non-negative expected profits ex

ante, so that ex ante debtor ..utility is. lower than under symmetric
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In most states, however, debtors are better off ex post than if

information.

they could then report their output state before revised repayment offers are
made.

In states for which repudiation provides higher utility than full

repayment, the debtor can receive higher utility under debt renegotiation than
the repudiation level.

Since under symmetric information, the debtor is

always forced to either its repudiation utility level or its maximal utility
over the set of new contracts with repayment (whichever is larger), direct
reporting of the value of output before the choice of a contract ex post is
Direct revelation only occurs with the selection of a separating

incredible.

equilibrium .contract revision.
Given a level of existing debt service obligations, R, the existing
R.), for each i, to maximize
creditor's problem is to find contracts, (i.,
1.
1.

The set of zero expected profit debt contracts, S, will be

expected profits.

found implicitly; however, we assume that it is non-empty and define a loan
offer, i ' , for each next period debt service obligation, R 1...

That is, i' (R.)
1.

is the size loan which repayment obligation R.1. equals in expected present
value for creditors.

The present value loss to a creditor from offering the

contract

01.., R.), is (i.1. - i' (R.)).
1.
1.

The existing creditor's problem is given by
n
(8)

max Z: p.(i'.(R.) - i.)
1.
1.
1.
1.
i=l
for i=l, . . ,n, subject to, for all i,
with respect to ((i.,R.)}
1.
1.

(a)
(b)

U(y.

1.

~ V(y., R)
+ i. - R) + f3EV(R.)
1.
1.
1.

~ ir(y.,R)
1.
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(c)

U(y.
.1

+ ,e_ -R) + f3EV(R.)

for all j

~

U(y.
.1

.1

.1

~

+ ,e_ -R) + f3EV(R.),
J

J

i.

Constraint (a) is the

The probability of output yi being realized is pi.

restriction that repudiation is inferior to the debt contract offered for each
value y., and (b) is the restriction on offers created by free entry in new
.1

contracts.

The contract (,£., R.)

The third is the self-selection constraint.

.1

is at least as good for the de.btor in state i as every other offer.

.1

We assume

that indifference for the debtor is resolved in the lender's favor to assure a
solution.
The solution to this problem yields a set of n offers ex post such that
debt repudiation never occurs.

The contracts offered to the debtor which are

taken in some states for which repudiation is superior to repayment on
contracted terms can provide greater utility than outright repudiation.
Likewise, in some states for which selection of a new ex ante debt contract
(with full repayment) is preferred to repudiation, the debtor will attain even
higher utility by taking a contract offered by the current creditor but not by
new entrants.

The self-selection constraints produce these possibilities by

creating trade-offs between expected profit in different states.

The

equilibrium contracts are interrelated.
The following proposition summarizes the properties of the equilibrium
set of debt renegotiations.

Define V(x., R.) ""'U(y. + ,e_ -R) + f3EV(R.),
.1

.1

.1

.1

.1

where x. = ..e.-R .
.1

.1

Proposition: Given current debt service obligations, the lender's most
preferred debt renegotiations satisfy:
a) x. and R. are both non-increasing in i .
.1

.1

b) V. (x. ,R.) is non-<lecreasing in i .
.1

.1

.1
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(An analogous condition may hold for additional i)

r
d) Whenever V. (x. ,R .) > max{V(y.
,R), V (y. ,R)),
.L

.L

.L

.L

V.(x.,R.)
.L

.L

V.(x.

.L

.L- 1

.L

.L

,R.

.L- 1

) holds .

e) If V.(x.,R.) = r(y.,R), then (,Q.,R.) ES, i. = x. + R, and
.L

.L

.L

(,Q.,R.) ES, for allj

J

J

.L

.L

.L

.L

.L

>i, so that V.(x.,R.) =r(y., R), also.
J

J

J

J

The proof of this proposition and additional hypotheses are contained in the
appendix.

Sappington (1983) presents similar results to part of the above for

a. simpler limited liability principal-agent problem.
In equilibrium, utility is nondecreasing and the net payment by the
debtor is nondecreasing in output, while the next period debt service
obligation is nonincreasing in output.

The set of debt renegotiations offered

forces the debtor in the lowest output state, if repudiation is ever preferred
to repayment, to its repudiation level of utility.

This may also be true for

higher states.
The debtor may choose contracts from the ex ante zero expected profit set
(contracts new entrants offer) in some high output states.

The equilibrium ex

post contract in these states may provide even higher utility.

If the debtor

attains just Vr(y.,R) in state y., then the existing creditor just offers the
.L

.L

same set of debt contracts which any new entrant will offer, S.

If the

solution to the creditor's problem has the debtor choose repayment and a new
zero expected profit contract in a state j, then the equilibrium choice in all
higher states is also repayment as contracted.

Result (d) states that the

debtor is indifferent between the equilibrium debt contract for the realized
state under renegotiation and the contract offered for the next lowest state,
except, possibly, in two situations.

The first occurs·when the current state
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renegotiated debt contract provides just the repudiation level of utility for
that state.

The second occurs when the contract chosen in equilibrium

involves full repayment for the present realization of output.
The continuous-state indifference property of result (d) and the above
exceptions deserve explanation.

If the debtor is offered a contract, (x.

i- 1

,

R.i - ), expected present value for the creditor in the next highest state can
1
always be increased if the debtor's utility can be reduced in this next
highest state.

Therefore, unless utility cannot be reduced further in state

i, the debtor is indifferent between the debt renegotiations for that state

and for the next lower state.

When the debtor achieves exactly the

repudiation level of utility or the level assured by free entry in new debt
contracts, this indifference may or may not hold.

If the debtor chooses a new

debt contract with full repayment in both the present state and next lower
state, under concavity of felicity, this property does not hold.
Figure 2 shows a separating equilibrium set of debt renegotiations.

The

intertemporal marginal rate of substitution portrayed decreases with y for a
given contract because U(c) is strictly concave.

Concavity is important for

demonstrating the proposition; however, concavity of U(c) does not imply that
the derived indifference curves are convex everywhere.

The relationship

between expected value and contractual debt service obligations depends on the
entire set of equilibrium debt contracts.

The indifference curves are drawn

smooth in Figure 2 for simplicity; with a finite number of states, they will
each contain kinks.

R.
l

I

I

I

I
I

I
I
I
-R

X4

x3

X2

Figure 2

xl

0

9, -R
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The equilibril.lIIl ex post contracts display a simple relationship between
the intertemporal rate of substitution in contract terms along the boundary of
S (zero expected profit contracts) and the intertemporal marginal rate of

substitution.

These are equal if full repayment occurs in equilibrium.

If
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then the slope of the
the debtor in state i is assigned contract (x.,R.),
1. 1.
equals the intertemporal rate of
boundary of Sat the contract (i' (R.),R.)
1.
1.
substitution if the debtor is not indifferent in state i+l between this
In the case of continuous state indifference, the

contract and (xi+l'Ri+l).

rate of contract substitution equals a weighted swn of the marginal rate of
substitution in state i and in state i+l.

The weight on the state i+l

marginal rate of substitution is negative, but smaller in absolute value than
the weight on the state irate of substitution.

This reflects the trade-off

to ex post expected profit between lowering state i profit by revising R.1. and
x. and increas.ing...&tate i+l profit by reducing utility in state i+l (lowering
1.
x. ). The marginal rate of substitution of R.1. for x.1. in state i is less than
1.+1
the intertemporal rate of contract substitution.
alone is not maximized.

Therefore, state i profit

The weights are implicitly given in the proof of th~

proposition; they depend upon the probability distribution of output and the
marginal felicity of conswnption in the two states.
Derivation of the set of initial loan contracts, S, remains.

The ex ante

expected profit is given by
n
E1r

-i

+

p

[R + I:

i=l

p.(i' (R.) - i.)],

1.

1.

1.

where (i.,R.) are solutions to the creditor's ex post optimization problem.
1. 1.
The last term (summand) is the expected present value of the reduction in debt
service received.

Even if£. exceeds£' (R.), the lender's return may exceed
1.
1.

opportunity cost in some states.

Maximization of expected profit will lead to

a non~ero probability that the debtor is willing to repudiate.

Risk

neutrality of creditors allows risk-averse debtors to achieve some degree of
insurance.

As in the well-known principal-agent literature (for example,

Holmstrom (1979), Harris and Raviv (1979)), risk sharing is incomplete due to
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the need for equilibrium debt renegotiation to observe the self-selection
constraints.

Maximization of ex ante expected profit gives the set of

non-negative expected profit contracts offered by new entrants.

We assume

that the utility function for the debtor, possible output states, and lender's
discount factor are adequate to assure that the set is non-empty and potential
debtors choose to borrow initially.
An important consequence of the proposition is that the maximal ex ante
contractual debt service obligation is at least as great as the resulting ex
post debt service for the succeeding period in the lowest output state.
increase in debt obligations beyond this level will never be met.

Any

A corollary

to the proposition is that this level of debt obligations is the maximum
amount such that ex post, the debtor repays in full and selects a new zero
expected profit contract in the highest output state.
equilibrium.

Figure 3 portrays this

The indifference curves are vertical beyond R1 , as increases in

R. have no effect on the debtor because such incremental repayment obligations
1.

are never repaid.
In a separating equilibrium, the net capital outflow from the debtor can
be either positive or negative in a state for which repudiation dominates full
repayment of existing debt service and choice of a new ex ante debt contract.
This contrasts with the equilibrium outcome under symmetric information.

The

possibility that the lender provides additional inflows to a recalcitrant
debtor arises when the repudiation level of utility depends upon the debt
service obligations that are repudiated.

Contracts that satisfy the necessary

conditions for expected profit maximization in low states may involve positive
values of x, because the intertemporal marginal .rate of substitution is finite
for the repudiation level of utility at contracts with zero net outflows (x
equal to zero).

This possibility does not arise if the cost of repudiation

R.
l

-R

0

Figure 3

9,

-R
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depends only on the current value of output.

In this case, the debtor will

always prefer a contract with zero net outflow to repudiation, regardless of
the next-period repayment obligation.

Therefore, in the lowest state, a net

payment to the existing creditor is made under debt renegotiation.
Two properties of the solution to the creditors' two-stage optimization
problem are notable.

The first is that there may be many equilibria; nothing

in this framework rules them out.

Multiple equilibria are likely to occur

when repudiation costs depend upon current debt service obligations.

The

second is that there is no reason that an ex ante state-contingent contract
not be written.

Such contracts can specify the same equilibrium set of

contracts as derived in the revision problem.

Ex post, the debtor reveals its

private information by selecting the net payment and contract for the next
period we characterized above.

Because the sovereign debtor always can choose

to accept none of the contracted payments and next period obligations and
select a new ex ante contract if utility is higher by doing so, such
state-contingent contracts will be solutions to an identical two-stage
problem.

The only difference is in interpretation.

We have solved the

problem of contract selection by creditors when the debtor has limited
liability, and there is always free entry in new debtor-creditor
relationships.

That is, the equilibrium state-contingent contract will assure

the debtor at least as much utility in the highest state as it attains by
meeting the current obligation and choosing a new creditor.
While we have represented the solution as formed by an initial debt
contract followed by debt renegotiation offers by the current creditor, when
both sides place positive probabilities on all possible subsequent events, a
more complex state-contingent contract would suffice.

There is no need for
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renegotiation.

If an event occurs upon which one of the parties to the

contract placed zero probability, however, a contract renegotiation can be
mutually beneficial.

For example, if there is an unanticipated change in the

world interest rate (creditors' discount rate), the creditor may wish to
revise the set of ex post contracts offered.

If a full state-contingent

contract binding on the creditor is in force, then only changes favoring the
debtor can be acceptable.

With private information, both the existing

separating contracts and any new offers can.be selected by the debtor.

If,

instead, the ex ante contract specifies only the loan principal and debt
service obligation, then the ex post contracts can be offered by the creditor
after observation of the interest rate shift.

The creditors can offer initial

relationships that specify contracts for each output state in every possible
realization of the world interest rate.

Because the world interest rate is

public information, such contingent debt contracts can provide welfare gains
when the creditor is risk neutral and debtor risk averse.

If the creditor's

discount rate is private information (for example, depending upon the
remainder of its loan portfolio), then debt·contracts with subsequent
renegotiation possibilities can arise in equilibrium.

We can also appeal to

the costs of writing or resolving disputes over complex state-contingent
contracts to support the assumption of renegotiation and to rule out interest
rate contingencies.
The effects of an interest rate shock (realization of

p

anticipated with

zero probability) on the set of ex post separating contracts is ambiguous.

An

increase in creditors' discount rates causes a reduction in the set of ex ante
contracts.

In states for which repayment is preferred to repudiation

(although the equilibrium debt renegotiation is not necessarily in S), there
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is a tendency for x. to fall and R.l. to increase (therefore, utility must
l.

decrease).

For states in which repudiation is superior, however, the change

in contract is ambiguous.

The interest rate increase will lead to a reduction

in debtor expected utility and a reduction in the present value of the
contract for the creditor.

III.

Separation through Costly Delay in Bargaining

The principal-agen t framework used in the previous two sections provides
insight into the nature of debt renegotiation outcomes when borrowers have
more bargaining power than just the options to return to the loan market or
repudiate.

If we allow output in any given period to be storable for some

positive length of time (however short, or with arbitrarily large but finite
rate of depreciation), then the equilibria derived in both the perfect and
imperfect information cases are equilibria for a strategic bargaining game in
which the creditor makes all offers (see Sobel and Takahashi (1983)).

For a

strategic bargaining game, with alternating offers, debtors will achieve
better outcomes ex post than were attained in the preceding solutions.
Nevertheless, the ex ante contract offers will adjust to account for the ex
post divisions of surplus in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
Bulow and Rogoff (1986) adopt the strategic approach to Nash bargaining
games under complete information, due to Rubinstein (1982), to sovereign debt
negotiations.

The creditor who acquires the right to impose sanctions by

making an initial loan sells a promise not to impose sanctions each period to
the debtor.

The amount paid in the subgame perfect equilibrium each period

for this property right is just the debt service payment.

The discounted

stream of these prices is equal to the amount initially lent under perfect
'competition among lenders.

The perfect equilibrium is.unique if penalization
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benefits creditors an arbitrarily small amount.

The complete information

model presented earlier in this paper needs minor additional assumptions to
fit the Rubinstein (1982) framework: let output be storable and let the debtor
be risk neutral.

In this setting, renegotiations will never result in new

inflows unless a new creditor will also supply them.

Under risk aversion,

access to new credit in the presence of seniority provisions can become the
object bargained over, but the characterization of renegotiations will not be
affected.

in the complete information bargaining approach, there is no

particular reason why the initial contract does not simply specify the perfect
equilibrium debt service payments.

If it does, then no bargaining actually

takes place.
The asymmetric information model can also be extended to a bargaining
framework.

Delays to agreement can lead to separation of debtors by type in

an alternating offers bargaining game.

Simultaneously offered contracts by

the creditor no longer serve the purpose of inducing truthful revelation.
Incomplete information can be introduced, as before, through asymmetric
observability of output, or through private information about rates of time
preference.

Delaying agreement can arise strategically to separate borrowers

with different realizations of privately observed random variables, or of
different social preferences, which are unobserved by creditors.

Delay can

also arise because one or both parties find that waiting for publicly observed
information to arrive is individually rational.

This case may be important

when creditors, as well as debtors, have limited liability and are therefore
risk loving.
This section outlines an approach to modeling socially costly delays to a
resolution of debt repayment problems.

The impasse in the current repayments

crisis and the consequent lack of funds to finance capital formation have been
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discussed widely.

In noncooperative Nash bargaining models, equilibrium delay

to agreement has been shown to arise in the presence of incomplete information
by a large number of authors.

We discuss one source of delay: strategic delay

necessary to convey the debtor's private information.
Our approach is to adopt the bargaining model with one-sided incomplete
information of Admati and Perry (1987), which has equilibrium· paths displaying
strategic delay to external borrowing by a growing economy.

Following Bulow

and Rogoff, we assume that by lending the creditor purchases a right to impose
sanctions; the promise not to exercise this right is then sold to the debtor
at the subgame-p-erfec t price and time.
occur immediately here.
absence of new credit.

Unlike their model, agreement need not

A major cost of delay to agreement will be the
New creditors may not provide additional funds to a

growing debtor in the presence of unresolved existing claims.

The reason is

that the net inflow of resources will affect the bargaining game between old
creditors and the debtor and therefore the investment undertaken by the
borrower.

The future flow of output following a given loan will, in general,

be less if existing claims need to be resolved.
Several possible approaches can motivate the adoption of the strategic
delay model.

The debtor is assumed to have private information about the

value it places on avoiding sanctions.

Sanctions are assumed to lead to lower

levels of per capita consumption than are attainable along an equilibrium path
for the bargaining game, so that debt repudiation will never occur in
equilibrium.

Capital accumulation is possible, and either the labor force

grows at a constant proportional rate or physical capital depreciates.
Foreign borrowing can be motivated by assuming that either the planner's
discount rate or the marginal productivity of capital exceed the world rate of
interest.

A simple model is one in which output, which depreciates in
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storage, is traded for capital goods which are noncompetitive imports.

During

an impasse, the per capita capital stock declines.
The private information of the debtor is about the surplus available to
pay creditors.

This can be the current realized value of output in a

stochastic model, as in previous sections, or it can be the minimum level of
per capita consumption politically acceptable in a renegotiation; or other
Suppose that whenever per capita consumption falls

debtor characteristics .
below some level,

c,

political leadership is replaced immediately (through

either parliamentary or nondemocratic means).

Then the surplus available to

service debt obligations, that is, the value placed on purchasing the promise
not to impose sanctions, is the amount of current resources exceeding those
needed to sustain

c along

a perfect equilibrium path.

policymakers are likely to be more informed about

c,

The country's
or, more generally, the

social cost of generating given levels of trade surpluses (for example, the
excess burden of indirect taxes).
We assume that output is produced using capital and labor according to a
constant returns-to-scal e technology.

Output is storable (depreciation can

occur, but need not) and is consumed or traded for investment goods, which are
not produced at home.

Let output be given by

y t = f(kt)
and let
t:,.k

t

Storage is given by st' so that

y t = ct + (-y 5 t-1 - st) - Rt '
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where; is the rate of depreciation of stored output and Rt is output
exported.
The trade surplus is just
Rt - i t'

We ignore sanctions by assuming that repudiations lead to consumption equal to
or less than the minimum politically acceptable in a negotiated settlement.
If lenders benefit from imposing sanctions, by any arbitrarily small positive
amount, then no subgame--perfect equilibrium involves repudiation without
consequent penalization (see Bulow and Rogoff).

We simply assume that

penalization for repudiation is a credible threat.
The policymaker's social welfare function is just
CX)

U = ~

f3

t

ct.

t=O
The value of the optimal capital accumulation program along a subgame--perfect
equilibrium path can be defined directly.

We first need to note that once the

debtor's private information is revealed, a complete information bargaining
subgame follows for the model described here.

The creditor's lack of

information about the value of sanctions to the debtor derives from potential
differences in the type of debtor, rather than imperfect information about its
current state.

This assumption allows us to look at a single episode, but the

generalization is a formal exercise.
The debtor's type is characterized by the maximum surplus it can transfer
to creditors in exchange for suspension of the threat of sanctions at a given
time.

Time matters both because the social discount rate is positive and the

per capita capital stock declines during delays to agreement.
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Suppose that the low c type repays at time 0.

Then the surplus (denoted

h ) in a given state, k 0 , is defined by the problem
0

I

V(k 0

h

>=

subject to
k
c

k

1

0

+ i - nk 0 ,

f(k ) - (h + i),
0

0

where V(k ) is the value of the debtor's utility along a subsequent

1

equilibrium path.

Let h

0

be the maximum value of h such that c 0 ~

c.

We can derive the debtor's value in terms of the amount paid the creditor
and the time at which settlement takes place by noting that if its type is
revealed, then subsequent negotiations have the unique complete information
bargaining solution, so that the value function is well defined.

If a pooling

equilibrium results (which is a possible outcome), then the game repeats.

If

the state variable, kt' is observed by the creditor, however, the type can be
inferred after one round with a pooling equilibrium outcome.
For given k , define the debtor's value of an agreement as

0

S( ht -R, t), for the low c type, and
S( .R,t -R, t), for the high

c type,

where .R,t < ht for an agreement which transfers an amount Rat time t to
creditors.
second.

S(· ,·) is increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the

The approach of Admati and Perry (1987) can now be applied.

Suppose at time 0, the lender can make an offer to which the debtor
replies at time 1.

The debtor will never accept an offer that provides less

value than the value of an offer it can make at time 1 that would be accepted
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by the lender.

The discount factor for the lender is determined by the

opportunity interest rate.

The results of Admati and Perry can be directly

applied to this model with algebraic modification.

The high surplus type can

refuse a current high offer and wait to receive an offer that the low surplus
type would accept.

In equilibrium, the low surplus debtor cannot offer at

time 1 an amount which the high surplus type would prefer to wait and offer to
taking the time 0 offer.

The low surplus debtor must wait long enough to make

a counteroffer to separate itself from the high surplus type when the
creditor's first (time 0) offer is the equilibrium offer for the high type in
the complete-inform ation bargaining game.
Multiple equilibria emerge from this approach.

Unique separating

equilibria exist for large enough creditors' priors that the debtor is of the
high surplus type.

These involve offering the complete information game

division for the high type at time 0.

The low type offers its complete

information game equilibrium division after a time delay adequate to signal
its type.

Separation becomes costly by reducing the surplus obtained by the

low value debtor and reducing through delay the available output that may be
divided.
If the creditor's prior belief is that there is a low probability that
the debtor is the high surplus type, both multiple separating and pooling
equilibria are possible.

For low priors, there exists only a unique pooling

equilibrium in which no delay occurs.

This latter equilibrium involves

lenders offering the complete information equilibrium repayment for the low
surplus type in time 0.

Either type accepts this offer.
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One consequence of introducing capital stock depreciatio n as a cost of
delay is to increase the possibilitie s for pooling equilibria to arise.
Another is that the cost of delay to the high surplus type can, in general, be
lower than the cost for the low surplus type.

Of course, the depreciatio n of

the capital stock also increases the effective discount factor for the
lenders.

Resulting separating equilbria may entail even longer delays with .

capital decumulatio n when the cost of delay is lower for high surplus types.
If there are many possible types of debtors (as noted above), a separating
equilibrium (or mixed pooling and separating equilibrium ) must entail a delay
between counteroffe rs· made by each possible type of debtor, in declining order
of surplus.

Because this type of delay does not disappear as the length of

time between possible offers shrinks to zero, significant costly delays to
agreement can arise.

IV.

Possible Extensions

Multi-Perio d Contracting
In the simple stationary consumption -smoothing model with potential
repudiation , multi-perio d debt contracts serve no additional purpose if
seniority provisions are enforceable .

If every creditor claims on an equal

footing renegotiatio n proceeds, then multi-perio d contracts with renegotiati on
may arise in equilibrium .

Creditors offering zero-expect ed profit loans

recognize that an entrant will offer an additional loan on terms preferred by
the debtor to those that would not reduce the value of earlier creditors'
claims.

A two-period contract may be profitable that reduces the debtor's

incentive to borrow additional amounts.

Such contracts can increase the ex

ante utility of the debtor in equilibrium by moving the chosen contract away
from the interest~at e-t:aking one toward the constrained first~est one
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(Kletzer (1984)).

Because renegotiatio n is possible, such a contract offers

the debtor an option to choose a particular second-peri od loan that, in events
in which it would be taken, new lenders would not offer.
An example of such contracts is one offering a loan that, taken by
itself, is expected to be profitable for the first period.

A clause is

included which obligates the lender to provide a new loan during the second
period, which entrants would not offer if performance criteria are met by the
debtor.

If these covenants are not fulfilled, the lender can choose to

declare a default and not provide the second loan.

A restriction on debt

dilution in the first period is a potential covenant; this type of contract
can be self-enforc ing for the sovereign debtor.

In the case of sovereign

loans, creditors may be subject to third-party enforcement of their obligation
if the debtor does not breach the contract, which can specify that disputes be
brought to the home court of the creditor.

The debtor will generally choose

not to breach the contract through first-period debt dilution.

Because the

debtor can choose to exercise the second-perio d option or select another debt
contract in the absence of renegotiatio n, the debtor's expected utility the
second period is increased, inducing first-period performance (if output in
the first-period is private information , then contract breach may occur in
equilibrium ).

These two-period loans may provide access to debt contracts in

the second period that the debtor desires in poor output states over market
contracts and chooses not to accept in high output states.

Because of the

debtor's limited liability (and consequent market imperfectio n), these loans
offer insurance possibiliti es that a sequence of one-period loans with
renegotiatio n do not.

In the event of a demanded second-peri od revision of

debt service obligations (which may become less probable), the obligations of
the creditor to supply a second loan can be voided by a contract clause.
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Therefore, in the event of a renegotiation of debt service, the multi-period
contracts have no effects.
The creditor's two-period lending problem is to maximize the expected
two-period profit with respect to the choice of contract terms while deciding
whether or not to declare a subsequent default in the event of contract breach
subject to· a series. of ·constraints.

These constraints·. include the debtor's

choice of accepting the contract over other contracts available and the
equilibrium choices in each output state at each of the two future dates of
the debtor.

That is, the creditor correctly values the repayment streams

along each equilibrium path for the subsequent subgames.

In the absence of

creditor observability of the debtor's output, the incentive compatibility
constraints employed in the previous section are imposed at each date.
If the opportunity cost to creditors is a random variable, then an
additional motive arises for multi-period contracts.

Since the set of offered

contracts shrinks with an increase in the world rate of interest, the second
period loan option will provide desirable insurance opportunities to the
debtor; if the lenders' opportunity cost of funds falls, then the second
period (or later) debt contract can be revised.

In equilibrium, in these

events the resulting debt contract will be the debtor's best contract from
among those offered by other lenders.

While risk-neutral lenders will offer

multi-period contracts providing higher utility to borrowers than equilibrium
single-period loans, interest rate increases benefit borrowers ex post and
interest rate declines lead to contract revision ex post.

Therefore, the

length of multi-period contracts in equilibrium is limited by the ex ante
expected profitability of debtor welfare-improvi ng contracts.

Such contracts

exist at all because the limited liability of debtors leads to equilibrium
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contractual marginal rates of interest exceeding average rates of interest on
their debts.
Unobservable Debtor Policy Choices
The supposition that debtor income is unobservable by creditors may
strike readers as peculiarly unrealistic.

The natural alternative is to

suppose that income is publicly observable while policy choices by the debtor
affecting the distribution of income are unobserved by creditors.

In a

stochastic environment, moral hazard in policy selection arises if policies
enhancing the probability of favorable outcomes for creditors (that is, if
they raise anticipated debt repayments) are costly to debtors.

The choice

between investment and current consumption is a standard example.
The first-best contracts for simple principal-agent problems have been
characterized when output is publicly observable, while the agent's choice of
an action affecting the distribtuion of output is known only to the agent
(Holmstrom (1979) and Rogerson (1985)).

These contracts specify divisions of

output as functions of the observable quantity, output alone.

In the repeated

principal-agent problem, the first-best contract depends upon the entire past
history of output, as well as current output.

The extent of risk sharing

between a risk-neutral principal and risk-averse agent is limited by the
necessity that the output-contingent contract provide incentives for the agent
to choose output-increasing actions.
In the model used in this paper, assume that debtor income is observed by
lenders, but that the distribution of income realizations depends upon a set
of current policies selected by the debtor, which cannot be observed directly
by creditors.

Let the distribution of income conditional on policy choice be

stationary, and assume that current-period felicity depends positively on
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current consumption and negatively on some measure of policy choice (for
example, investment).
Constrained first-best capital flows can be characterized under a number
of special assumptions for the problem of maximizing debtor utility subject to
the constraints that repudiation is never chosen in equilibrium, expected
profits are zero in every period, and the contract is incentive compatible in
the choice of policy.

In a nontrivial step, this problem can be reduced to a

static maximization problem using Bellman's equation when the incentive
compatibility constraint can be written as a first-order condition (Spear and
Srivastava (1987)).

The pattern of capital flows between lenders and

borrowers over time (as a function of the history of income) can be
characterized if additional assumptions are made about the nature of the
conditional distribution of income.
Suppose that the only policy instruments available to the debtor
government for transferring resources from the private sector to service debt
create distortions in the domestic economy (for example, commodity taxes).

In

this case, the contracts that satisfy the first-order incentive compatibility
condition (that is, are locally maximal for lenders) will tend not to lead to
the optimal pattern of capital flows (constrained by the asymmetry of
information).

In such a model, a serious coordination problem can arise

between creditors and debtors because complementarities between policy choices
and external capital flows can arise.

Large .net capital outflows may be

compatible with distortionary policies that reduce the expected return to new
loans.

The possibility that unsatisfactory equilibria arise when the policies

required to meet large debt service obligations are distortionary can create a
significant international public policy problem.

While the public goods

.problem of cooperation between lenders suggested by others (for example, Sachs
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(1984), Krugman (1985, 1987)) may not be severe in light of the possibilities
for coordination between creditors, a problem of coordination between debtor
government policy selection and creditor lending choices would tend to be
particularly difficult to address.
The derivation of a first-best contract solution for the model with
privately observed investment levels but publicly observed output is possible
given strong assumptions.

However, the introduction of explicit

debt-contracts with ex post renegotiation into this framework makes for a very
difficult theoretical problem.

Second-best contracting with renegotiations

should involve outcomes (new flows of capital) that depend upon the entire
past history of output.

V.

Conclusions

The principal-agen t framework adopted in this paper has implications for
evaluating the argument for "defensive" lending to recalcitrant debtors.
Under perfect information, a debt renegotiation never entails new concurrent
flows of funds to the debtor and always involves a contract equivalent to a
debt write-down combined with a new zero--Bxpected profit loan.

The

"rescheduling" of willingly unmet debt service obligations in the form of a
new loan does not occur in equilibrium in the model of this paper.

The

present value of the option on potential future repayments is less than its
opportunity cost to the creditor at the margin in the stationary stochastic
environment.
In the presence of informational asymmetries, equilibrium for the
creditor-debto r renegotiation problem is a separating type.

In lower output

states, smaller current payments are made with larger debt service obligations
· carried forward.

A debtor unwilling to mee:t. current debt. service may obtain

,i
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new net inflows in a constrained optimal response by creditors only in the
version of the model in which the penalties for repudiation increase with the
debt service repudiated.

This follows because a debtor may prefer to

repudiate now with R relatively low to simply consuming current output while
incurring larger future debt service obligations with the consequent reduction
in expected utility.
The separating nature of equilibria derived in the imperfect information
case may have implications for the evaluation of the (stochastic) debt service
burden.

Subsequent poor output realizations may lead in only a few steps to

the maximal level of debt service obligations possible with net outflows or
only minor net inflows of capital along the way.

This might be the most

significant cost of the informational imperfection.

Such an expansion of debt

service burden does not occur in equilibrium under symmetric information.

In

the first model, the debt service obligations have a stationary unconditional
long-'run distribution; under asymmetric information, they follow a simple
Markov process instead.
Our model stands in contrast to an important paper on indeterminacy in
lending under possible bankruptcy by Hellwig (1977).

In that paper, the

creditor sets a credit limit, which is optimal ex post to relax when it is
reached by the debtor.

If it is not relaxed, bankruptcy occurs automatically

and the lender receives nothing.

Additional loans are expected to be

profitable because they raise the value of existing loans; no new creditor
will provide them, but an existing creditor should.
"defensive" lending.

This is exactly

However, the interest schedule is given to the creditor,

and the creditors' policies are restricted to setting limits on the stock of
debt (so that time inconsistency arises).

We have relaxed two constraints

imposed by Hellwig: default need not be declared following a breach of
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contract, and the interest charged in a renegotiation of debt is a choice
variable for the existing creditors.
set of policies.
stationary one.

Current lenders have access to a richer

Hellwig uses a hazard process for income, while we adopt a
It is not clear if this is essential.
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Appendix

Outline of proof of proposition:
To show that x. is non-increasing in i, we use the self-selection
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constraint
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The Lagrangian for the creditor's optimization problem is
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Necessary conditions for a maximum are
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Because the derivative of i.. with respect to R. may not be well defined for
.L

.L

discrete values of y, (2) should be interpreted as the appropriate weak
inequalities for right and left derivatives.
to be continuous.

The function i.'. (R.) can be shown
.L

.L
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Following Sappington (1983), a ..= 0 for j>i+l and for j<i-1.
1.J
fact that x. < x.
if j>i+l, suppose the converse.
J
1.+1
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Then, the i
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similar argument
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In case of equality, 1. + 8. > 0, and with inequality, 8. = 0.
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The above properties can be used recursively to derive values for each
multiplier.
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